This paper studies a tax competition over a foreign firm that is to decide its production location. In addition to the sealed-bid first price auction, we consider the English auction under both complete and incomplete information as to competiting countries' valuations of the firm, and show that countries may bid beyond their own valuations if their citizens own some shares of the firm.
Introduction
There is now a well established literature on international competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g., Haaparanta 1996 Of particular relevance to our analysis is Haufler and Wooton (1999) . They examine the outcome of the competition between two governments to attract a single, foreignowned firm's production facility that will manufacture goods for both national markets.
With identical potential host nations bidding to attact the firm, each country is prepared to undercut its rival's offer such that, in equilibrium, this "race to the bottom" has transferred all of the winner's gains from the FDI to the firm. Thus the host country fares no better than the losing country, despite receiving the investment. This outcome changes when one nation is larger than the other. A size asymmetry will result in the larger country winning the bidding contest, as it is both more attractive to the investor and is prepared to pay a larger subsidy (or offer lower corporate taxation) in order to capture the FDI. Despite the larger country's greater willingness to pay to attract the FDI, it need only slightly improve upon the offer made by the rival, smaller country and thereby captures for itself some of the benefits of the FDI. Ferrett and Wooton (2008) use the same framework to investigate whether the assumption that the firm is owned entirely by individuals who do not live either bidding country has an impact on the outcome of the competition. They establish an "invariance result"
showing that the unique equilibrium of a tax/subsidy competition game between the two governments is independent of how the firm's ownership is distributed internationally. Their result applies both to the equilibrium location of the firm's plant and to the countries' equilibrium tax/subsidy offers. Thus the nationality of the firm is irrelevant to the strategy that a potential host country should follow in offering investment incentives. This conclusion is quite significant for the policymaker who can ignore the ownership of the firm. Indeed, the policymaker need never know who the firm belongs to.
As with Haufler and Wooton, Ferrett and Wooton treat the bidding contest as a si-multaneous, complete information game, finding the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. In our analysis in this paper, we examine the impact of changing the contest from the sealed-bid auctions of the previous literature to a more-realistic, English auction, where the contestants react sequentially to their rivals' offers. We further consider the implications of introducing a degree of uncertainty on the part of each government regarding the benefits that the other nation will achieve from attracting the FDI. We shall show that Ferrett and Wooton's invariance result may break down in these settings, such that the distribution of the firm's ownership affects the outcome of the contest. One outcome of note is that, if a country's citizens own some share of the firm, its government may offer a bid beyond its valuation of the investment.
Model
There are two countries, A and B, bidding to attract the investment of a single firm. The government of country i (i = A, B) makes an offer of b i to the firm in order to attract its investment. When b i > 0 the country is prepared to subsidize the investment, while b i < 0 is a tax on the firm. We make the simplification that, in the absence of these transfers, the firm is indifferent between the two potential host locations as its profits are identical and equal to π from producing in either country.
1 After the governments make their bids, the monopolist decides where to locate its plant while the product markets in A and B are served in the final stage.
The benefit to country i of having local investment is assumed to be S ii , while it gets S ij (i = j) when the firm produces in country j and services its market through international trade. We assume that local investment is always preferred to imports and hence S i ≡ S ii − S ij , country i's valuation of the FDI, is always positive. 2 We assume, without loss of generality, that S A ≥ S B > 0 in the case where countries' valuations are common knowledge.
Thus country A values the investment at least as much as country B does.
In addition to the benefits of the FDI to the nation as a whole, country i's citizens are assumed to own a fraction e i of the investing firm and consequently receive that share of the firm's after-tax profits. We write W ij for country i's overall welfare benefit payoff from the firm locating in country j. Then, country i's welfare, dependent upon the location of the investment, is given by
Let the net welfare benefit of hosting the firm be W i ≡ W ii − W ij . Thus country i strictly prefers hosting the firm if and only if
and is indifferent to the location of the firm if W i = 0. As pre-tax profits are assumed to be the same for the firm regardless of where it locates, (b i − b j ) is the difference in the firm's net profits from choosing to invest in country i.
Simultaneous bidding under complete information
We start with a sealed-bid auction, identical to that of Ferrett and Wooton (2008) , where the governments make their offers simultaneously and irreversibly. This yields a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Ferrett and Wooton restrict their attention to outcomes where the countries do not make weakly dominated bids. Thus neither country ever makes a bid higher than its valuation of the investment. 3 We shall, at least initially not impose this limitation on the potential equilibria.
activity. 3 This rules out cases where a country would lose if it were to succeed in attracting the firm and makes a high offer only because it is certain that the firm will reject the overly generous subsidy in favour of a better deal being offered by the other country which values the investment more highly. Indeed, it can be shown that country i's offering at its own valuation S i weakly dominates any offer that is strictly higher than S i .
Given that pre-tax profits of the firm are the same in both potential host countries, country A wins the auction only if
Country A will surely win if it offers the firm a bigger subsidy or lower tax than its rival, country B.
Consider country A's best response to its rival's bid b B . We show that country A should offer:
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. These bids are explained as follows. (i) If country B were to set tax greater than the firm's pre-tax profits, the firm would make a loss if it were to locate in that country and would never invest there. All that country A needs to do in order to attract the firm is to make an offer that would allow it at least to break even, that is b A + π ≥ 0. Thus, country A's optimal strategy is to set tax such that it fully extracts the firm's profits from the FDI. (ii) Were country B to offer a smaller tax (or grant a subsidy) to the firm such that it would makes an after-tax profit from its FDI, country A would have to improve on its offer in order to win the auction. The winning offer is a tax/subsidy that gives the firm ε more in after-tax profits than it would get from locating in country B. (iii) There are limits to country A's generosity, however, as it will only be prepared to offer a subsidy up to its valuation of the investment when it has a chance of winning the auction. If country B were to offer a subsidy equal to country A's valuation such that b B = S A , country A has two options. It can either try to attract the FDI by matching country B's bid. In such a case, it follows from (3) that W A = 0, meaning that country A receives no benefit from the investment. Otherwise, country A could make a lower bid that would ensure that it lost the auction. Thus, regardless of whether or not country A It is easy to see that, given country A wins the auction, neither country has an incentive to deviate from their prescribed strategies. Country A's equilibrium bid can be viewed as the limit strategy as ε goes to zero. Country A attracts the investment at minimum cost, given its rival's bid, so has no incentive to deviate. Country B, on the other hand, wishes to lose the contest given country A's bid, and this is the outcome in equilibrium.
If the two countries had identical valuations of the firm, S = S A = S B , then each country would bid its valuation and the equilibrium bids would be identical, b * A = b * B = S. The firm would then be indifferent between locations and might invest in either country. The winning nation would be no better off than the loser, as all of the rent from the investment would be transferred to the firm in the subsidy. This is the familiar "race to the bottom" in taxes.
Ferrett and Wooton's (2008) result, that the international distribution of the firm's ownership is irrelevant to the outcome of the game, can be understood by considering the objective function of country i given by (3) . The citizens' ownership of the firm e i is multiplied by the difference in the two countries' bids; the citizens in country i capture the fraction e i of their country's bid but lose the opportunity to capture the same fraction of the rival nation's bid.
It might seem that this should influence the equilibrium offers and perhaps the location of the FDI. However, the bids made by the countries are such that the firm is only just persuaded to locate in one location over the other. Thus, in equilibrium, the bids are equal because the firm considers the two locations as being equally attractive. Consequently the first term in (3) is zero with domestic shareholders being unaffected by the equilibrium location of the FDI. Thus the distribution of ownership of the firm has no effect on the strength of national bids nor on the eventual locational choice of the firm in equilibrium Proposition 2 There exists a unique undominated Nash equilibrium in which b * A = b * B = S B and the firm locates itself in country A. The winning bid is the minimum bid of all the Nash equilibrium bids. 4 The undominated Nash equilibrium is the outcome considered by Ferrett and Wooton (2008) .
We now change the first stage of the game to that of an English auction in which each country has the opportunity to respond to the bid of its rival. It might be argued that this better reflects the reality of inter-governmental competition for investment, in that the firm can play potential host countries off against each other and thereby extract the highest offer from them. We therefore allow each country the chance to bid an amount ∆ above the standing bid of its rival. Recall that we are assuming that pre-tax profits are the same in both locations for the firm, consequently the winner is the country whose standing bid does not attract an improved bid from the other nation.
Let country j's standing bid be b j . Given country i's net welfare benefit of hosting the firm given by (3), it will raise its bid to b i = b j + ∆ if and only if
That is, country i will improve its bid as long as the additional cost (that part of the extra incentive that does not accrue to shareholders in country i) does not push the cost of the subsidy beyond the country's valuation of the FDI should it become the host nation.
Whenever (4) holds for country i, following a bid by its rival, it will bid again and the cycle will continue. We derive the limit equilibrium as ∆ goes to zero. It follows from (4) that in the limit equilibrium, country i raises its bid as long as S i > b j . In following this strategy, country B gains 2∆e B relative to its having stopped bidding in the earlier round.
Consider the case in which S
If citizens of country B have no ownership shares in the firm (e B = 0), there exist multiple subgame perfect equilibria whose outcomes are the same as in the case of the sealed-bid auction. Country A's winning bid must be at least S B otherwise country B would continue to bid. Moreover, B is indifferent to any b A ∈ [S B , S A ] so long as it loses, since it gets S BA in any event. Country B also knows that its bid will be countered if country A's bid is in this range. So the eventual loser can raise country A's winning bid to any level in this range. As with simultaneous bidding, the undominated subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that country A wins the auction with its winning bid of S B .
On the other hand, if some of the firm is owned by citizens of country B (that is, e B > 0), the subgame perfect equilibrium will be unique and characterized by country A winning with a bid of S A . This is because country B knows that country A will be prepared to raise its Country i's strategy is characterized by its threshold of dropping out of the auction.
Country i will only counterbid if the expected payoff from raising the standing bid by ∆ is not less than the guaranteed payoff from dropping out of the auction and letting its rival attract the FDI. This permits us to determine country i's threshold bid asb i (S i ), the value of the standing bid at which the expected returns from staying in the auction and from dropping out are equalized. Thus, country i will only stay in the auction, making a counterbid to country j if the latter's last bid is below country i's threshold bid, that is would arise with probability
the probability that country A's bid b A = b B +∆ exceeds B's threshold bidb B (S B ) conditional on the event that S B is large enough that B has countered A's previous bid of b B − ∆, that is
. The second outcome is where country B does respond to country A's bid with a higher offer (after which country A will have to decide once again whether to make a further bid), which would arise with probability 1 − P B (b B + ∆). Country A calculates the expected payoff that it would receive from making a new bid and compares this to the guaranteed payoff from dropping out of the auction without further bidding.
Since country A's expected payoff from making a new bid is at least as large as the expected payoff from making a new bid and dropping out of the auction in its next turn if the new bid is countered by B, it will stay in the auction and make a new bid if and only if
If P B (b B + ∆) = 0, the first term of (6) is zero and country B will definitely continue to bid. In this case, it is certainly worthwhile for country A to make a further bid, even if it eventually loses the auction, as the payment made to citizens owning a share of the firm is driven up. If, at the other extreme, P B (b B + ∆) = 1 and country A's next bid would certainly win the auction, the decision as to whether to make a further bid depends upon country A's valuation of the investment relative to the cost of attracting it, that is whether
This argument is made more transparent if we rewrite (6) by subtracting the right-hand side from the left-hand side as
Substituting (5) into (7), we obtain a new condition for country A to be prepared to make a further bid
Once again, we let ∆ → 0 to obtain
where we have usedb (8) with equality. Thus, country A's threshold bid can be written as
Similarly, we obtain country B's threshold bid as
Observe that if e A = 0, thenb A (S A ) = S A . Country A has no incentive to bid above its valuation of S A and risk "winning" the auction in order to push up country B's bid, as none of this will benefit citizens in country A. If on the other hand e A > 0, country A is willing to take a risk to try to raise the winning bid hoping that B eventually wins the auction. The threshold bid balances the cost of possible winning the auction beyond its own valuation and the benefits of an increase in the value of the firm's shares that country A owns in case of losing the auction.
Proposition 4
In the English auction under incomplete information, each country i continues to bid until the standing bid reaches its own valuation of the firm S i if e i = 0, whereas it bids beyond the valuation if e i > 0. The higher is e i , the higher is the threshold bid. A country may lose by winning the auction.
An example
To gain more insights of the result, let us specify the probability distribution as the exponential distribution with the support [a, ∞), i.e.,
This probability distribution has a mean of a i + 1/λ i and a variance of 1/λ
for any b i . Thus, threshold bids expressed in (9) and (10) can be rewritten as
The larger the share of the firm held by a country, the greater its willingness to continue in the auction, in order to push up the expected redistribution of after-tax profits to its own citizens. Moreover, the higher the mean (and hence the variance) of the rival country's valuation, the greater its willingness to continue the auction, since the risk of winning the auction is smaller when it raises the bid at any stage of the auction.
Toexamine the properties of the equilibrium, let us look at several specific cases one by one. This is because country B is no longer confident that country A would match B's bid beyond S A when the information is incomplete.
S A > S
2. S A > S B and e A /λ B = e B /λ A > 0.
Country A wins with the winning bid of S B + (e B /λ A ). The winning bid may exceed country A's valuation S A if e B is large or λ A is small; country B's threshold bid is high if B has a large incentive to raise the rival country's winning bid (i.e., e B is large) or if the risk of B's winning with a bid beyond S B is small (i.e., λ A is small). Note also that this outcome is more likely to occur if e A is large or λ B is small so that A's threshold bid is more likely to exceed B's. (Note that in this example, e A /λ B = e B /λ A .)
3. S A = S B and e A /λ B = e B /λ A > 0.
Either country A or B wins the auction with the winnning bid of S A + (e A /λ) = S B + (e B /λ), which certainly exceeds the winner's valuation of the FDI. The two countries "race beyond the bottom" if they turn out to be symmetric.
4. S A > S B and S A + (e A /λ B ) < S B + (e B /λ A ).
Country B wins the auction even though A's valuation of the FDI is higher than B's. The resulting location of the firm is inefficient, and country B certainly loses by winning the auction.
We record some of the above findings in the following proposition. 
Concluding remarks
This paper has considered whether the results of Ferrett and Wooton (2008) , that the international distribution of a firm's ownership has no impact on the competition to attract its investment, are robust to the nature of the competition (the design of the auction) and the knowledge structure of the game. We show that ownership makes a difference whenever an English auction is used to determine the outcome (as opposed to simulataneous bids). 
